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The theory of strategic games with complete information starts with the works
of J. von Neumann [10] and J. Nash [5]. Here the payoﬀ functions assign real
numbers to strategy proﬁles. Extensions to multicriteria games (MC-games for
short) are given in Shapley [6] and Borm et al. [1]. The payoﬀ functions here
assign to strategy proﬁles vectors of length equal to the number of criteria of
a player. For more details about multi-criteria games the reader can see also
[7] and [12].
Harsanyi in [3] introduces games with incomplete information for a player
about the real valued payoﬀ functions of the other players.
A natural follow up is taken in this paper where we study interactive
situations with incomplete information and where each player may have vari-
ous objectives.
As far as we know, these Bayesian MC-games are not studied till now. It is
easy to imagine practical interactive situations demanding to be modeled as
Bayesian-MC-games (BM-games for short).
Natural solution concepts will be that of BM-equilibrium and of approximate
BM-equilibrium.
In this paper we ﬁrst concentrate on the existence of such equilibria in mixed
strategies for situations where each player has a ﬁnite number of pure strate-
gies, a ﬁnite number of criteria and a ﬁnite number of types.
Then we consider situations where one of the players may have an inﬁnite
set of pure strategies. The work of A. Wald [13] indicates already that it is
diﬃcult to obtain general equilibrium results if more than one player has a
large strategy space.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the Bayesian
Multi-Criteria games (BM-games) and the natural equilibrium concept of
Bayesian Multi-Criteria Equilibrium (BM-equilibrium). We prove that in case
the type spaces and action spaces are ﬁnite there exists a BM-equilibrium in
mixed strategies. In section 3 we study BM-games with ﬁnite type spaces and
all but one ﬁnite action spaces. An upper boundedness condition guarantees
then the existence of -BM-equilibria. Section 4 concludes.
2 Bayesian multi-criteria games
A Bayesian multicriteria game (BM-game for short) models a conﬂict situation
with incomplete information where possibly players have multiple objectives.
The incomplete information is described with the aid of a type space for each
player and a probability distribution on the set of type space proﬁles. In this
paper we restrict our attention to ﬁnite type spaces. Further the criteria spaces
2for each player will be supposed to be ﬁnite. To be more concrete an n-person
BM-game is a tuple:
Γ =< N,A1,A2,...,An,T1,T2,...,Tn,p,C1,C2,...,Cn,u1,u2,...,un >,
for short: Γ =< N,A,T,p,C,u >. Here
- N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of players;
- for each i ∈ N the action space is Ai, and A =
Q
i∈N Ai, the type space is Ti
and Ci is the criteria space;
- p is a probability distribution on the set T =
Q
i∈N Ti of type proﬁles;
- ui : Ci × A × T → R is the payoﬀ function which assigns to player i the
payoﬀ ui(ci,a1,a2,...,an,t1,t2,...tn) to his criterium ci given that the players
1,2,...,n have type t1,t2,...,tn and choose actions a1,a2,...an respectively.
A play of such a game proceeds as follows: before the types are announced
each player i chooses a strategy xi ∈ Ai
Ti (where then action xi(t) is chosen
if ti turns out to be the type of player i). Each type proﬁle t results then for
player i in a payoﬀ ui(ci,x1(t1),...xn(tn),t1,...,tn) w.r.t. his criterion ci.
The a-priori expected payoﬀ for player i w.r.t. criterion ci ∈ Ci, if the players




Let  > 0.
An  − BM equilibrium of < N,A,T,p,C,u > is a strategy proﬁle




2 × ... × ATn
n such that for each i ∈ N, each ci ∈ Ci,
each xi ∈ A
Ti
i :
Ui(ci, ˆ x1, ˆ x2,..., ˆ xn) ≥ Ui(ci, ˆ x−i,xi) − .
Here (ˆ x−i,xi) :=(ˆ x1,..., ˆ xi−1,xi, ˆ xi+1,...ˆ xn), the proﬁle which we obtain when
player i deviates from ˆ xi to xi.
Remarks 2.1
(i) If in Γ the criteria spaces are trivial i.e. |C1| = |C2| = ...|Cn| = 1, then we
can write < N,A,T,p,u > and we obtain a classical Bayesian game (B-game)
3and then an approximate Bayesian Pareto equilibrium ( − BPE for short)
boils down to an approximate Bayesian equilibrium ( − BE for short).
(ii) If in Γ the type spaces are trivial i.e. |T1| = |T2| = ...|Tn| = 1 then we can
write < N,A,C,u > and we obtain a classical multi-objective game (M-game)
and an −BPE boils down to an −PE (approximate Pareto equilibrium).
(iii) If the type spaces and the criteria spaces are trivial then we obtain a
classical game in strategic form with complete information (C-game for short).
We will need the notion of f-mixed extension of a BM-game for existence results
of equilibria.
The letter ”f” in f-mixed extension stands for ﬁnite because we allow only
ﬁnite mixtures of pure strategies to avoid convergence problems.
Let Γ =< N,A1,A2,...,An,T1,T2,...,Tn,p,C1,C2,...,Cn,u1,u2,...,un >.
Then the f-mixed extension of Γ is the BM-game
˜ Γ =< N, ˜ A1, ˜ A2,..., ˜ An,T1,T2,...,Tn,p,C1,C2,...,Cn, ˜ u1, ˜ u2,..., ˜ un >
Here ˜ Ai is the family of probability measures (on the σ-algebra of all subsets
of Ai) with ﬁnite support. Such probability measures are of the form
µi = Σs
k=1pkeak where a1,a2,...,as ∈ Ai, pk ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1,2,...,s} and
Σs





1 if B ⊂ Ai, ak ∈ B
0 if B ⊂ Ai, ak / ∈ B
Further ˜ ui(c,µ1,µ2,...,µn,t) =
R
ui(c,a1,a2,...,an,t)dµ1(a1)dµ2(a2)...dµn(an)
for all i ∈ N and (µ1,µ2,...,µn) ∈ ˜ A =
Q
i∈N ˜ Ai
A BM-game is called a ﬁnite game if the action spaces A1,A2,...,An are ﬁnite
sets. For ﬁnite C-games Γ, Nash in [5] proves that the f-mixed extension ˜ Γ
possesses an equilibrium point and for ﬁnite B-game Γ, Harsanyi in [3] proves
the existence of Bayesian equilibrium for the mixed extension Γ. In both proofs
ﬁxed point theorems play a role applied on the aggregate best response mul-
tifunction.
In [1] the existence of Pareto equilibria is proved for mixed extensions of ﬁnite
M-games by transforming such a game to a C-game with the aid of weight
4vectors for each player on the various objectives and then using the classi-
cal existence result of J. Nash. We do not know literature where BM-games
are studied. But inspired by the proof in [1] it is not diﬃcult to obtain the
following existence result.
Theorem 2.2 Mixed extensions of ﬁnite BM-games have a BM-equilibrium.
Proof Transform with the aid of weight vectors the BM-game into a B-game
and apply the existence theorem of Bayesian equilibria of Harsanyi. It is easy
to show that each Bayesian equilibrium in the B-game is a Bayesian multi-
criteria equilibrium in the BM-game. 
3 Almost ﬁnite BM-games and approximate equilibria
We will call a BM-game
Γ = hN,A1,A2,...,An,T1,T2,...,Tn,p,C1,C2,...,Cn,u1,u2,...,uni
almost ﬁnite if
(i) N,A1,A2,...,An−1,T1,T2,...,Tn,C1,C2,...,Cn are ﬁnite sets and An is inﬁ-
nite,
ii) un : Cn × A × T → R is an upper bounded function.
Let  > 0. We are interested in the existence of -BM equilibria for ˜ Γ. Our
main result in this section is:
Theorem 3.1 Let Γ be an almost ﬁnite game. Then for each  > 0 there is
an -BM equilibrium for ˜ Γ.
Proof (i) Take  > 0. The proof is based on the following claim which we
prove at the end of this section.
CLAIM. Given Γ, there is a ﬁnite BM-subgame Γ() of Γ with
Γ() = hN,A1,...,An−1,An(),T1,T2,...,Tn,p,,C1,C2,...,Cn,u1,...,uni
and An() is a ﬁnite subset of An such that for each an ∈ An there is an
an() ∈ An() such that for all cn ∈ Cn, t ∈ T, a−n ∈ A−n we have
un(cn,(a−n,an()),t) ≥ un(cn,(an−1,an),t) −  (3.1)
5[ So an() is -almost as good as an for player n].
We call Γ() an -approximation of Γ.
(ii) Using the above claim we prove that the f-mixed extension ˜ Γ() of Γ()
is an -approximation of ˜ Γ i.e. for each ν = (νtn)tn∈Tn ∈ ˜ An
Tn there is a
ν = (ν
tn)tn∈Tn ∈ ( ˜ An())Tn such that for all cn ∈ Cn, t ∈ T, µ−n ∈ ˜ A−n, we
have
˜ un(cn,µ−n,ν
tn,t) ≥ ˜ un(cn,µ−n,νtn,t) −  (3.2)
For the proof note that the CLAIM implies that we can deﬁne a selection
β : An → An() such that β(a) = a for each a ∈ An() and
un(cn,(a−n,β(an)),t) ≥ un(cn,(a−n,an),t) −  (3.3)
for each cn ∈ Cn, t ∈ T, a−n ∈ A−n, an ∈ An \ An(). Given ν ∈ ˜ An
Tn and













{ν(a) : β(a) = b})eb.
Then (ν
tn)tn∈Tn ∈ ( ˜ An())Tn, and (3.2) follows from (3.3).
(iii) By theorem 2.2 we can ﬁnd a mixed BM-equilibrium
(ˆ ν1, ˆ ν2,..., ˆ νn) ∈ ˜ A1
T1 ×...× ˜ An−1
Tn−1 ×... ˜ An()Tn of the mixed extension ˜ Γ()
of the ﬁnite game Γ().
Deﬁne for each µ ∈ ˜ An() the mixed strategy α(µ) ∈ ˜ An by
α(µ)(C) = µ(C
T
An()) for each ﬁnite C ⊂ An.
We prove that (ˆ ν1, ˆ ν2,..., ˆ ν(n−1),(α((ˆ νn)tn))tn∈Tn) is an -BM equilibrium of Γ.
First, note that for each i ∈ N \ {n}, ci ∈ Ci, µi ∈ ˜ Ai we have
6Ui(ci,(ˆ νk)k∈N\{i,n},µi,(α((ˆ νn)tn))tn∈Tn)=
P
t∈T p(t)˜ ui(ci,( ˆ νk(t))k∈N\{i,n},µi(t),α((ˆ νn)tn,t))=
=
P
t∈T p(t)˜ ui(ci,( ˆ νk(t))k∈N\{i,n},µi(t), ˆ νn(t),t)=
=Ui(ci,(ˆ νk)k∈N\{i,n},µi, ˆ νn)≤ Ui(ci,(ˆ νk)k∈N),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that ˆ ν is a mixed
BM-equilibrium of ˜ Γ(). So deviation from ˆ νi to µi does not pay for player
i ∈ N \ {n}.
Secondly, note that for player i = n deviation from α((ˆ νn)t)t∈T to µn ∈ ˜ An
pays at most  because
Un(cn,(ˆ νk)k∈N\{n},µn)=Σt∈Tp(t) ˜ un(cn,(ˆ νk(t))k∈N\{n},µn(t),t) ≤
≤ Σt∈Tp(t) ˜ un(cn,(ˆ νk(t))k∈N\{n},(µ
n(t))t∈T,t) +  ≤
≤ Σt∈Tp(t) ˜ un(cn,(ˆ νk(t))k∈N,t) + =
=Un(cn,(ˆ νk)k∈N\{n},α((ˆ νn)t)t∈T) + 
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (3.2) and the second inequality from
the fact that (ˆ ν1, ˆ ν2,..., ˆ νn−1, ˆ νn) is an -BM equilibrium of ˜ Γ(). 
It remains to prove the CLAIM in the proof of theorem 3.1. For this objective
the following two theorems are helpful.
A proof of theorem 3.2 can be found in [9].
Theorem 3.2 (Finite covering property by orthants for upper bounded sets
in an Euclidean space).
For each upper bounded set V in Rn and each  > 0, there is a ﬁnite subset W
of V such that
V ⊂
[
{O(w,) s.t. w ∈ W}
where O(w,) is the orthant
7{x ∈ Rm s. t. xi ≤ wi +  ∀i ∈ {1,2,...,m}}. 
A direct consequence of this theorem is the next theorem 3.3, which one can
also ﬁnd in [8] as lemma 4.3.
For convenience of the reader we give also the proof.
Theorem 3.3 Let E be a ﬁnite set,  > 0 and let F be an upper bounded
family of real valued function on E. Then there exists a ﬁnite subfamily G of
F which -dominates F i.e.
∀f ∈ F ∃g ∈ G : ∀x ∈ E [f(x) ≤ g(x) + ]
Proof. Let E = {a1,a2,...,am}. For each f ∈ F let α(f) be the vector
(f(a1),f(a2),...,f(am)) in Rm. Since F is an upper bounded family of func-
tions, the set V = {α(f) : f ∈ F} is an upper bounded subset of Rm.
In view of theorem 3.2 we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite subset W of V, which  domi-
nates V . But then G= {f ∈ F : α(f) ∈ W} is a ﬁnite subfamily of F which
-dominates F. 
Now we are able to give the
Proof of the CLAIM in theorem 3.1. Given the almost ﬁnite game Γ, we con-
sider the upper bounded family
F={ ˆ an : E → R : an ∈ A} of functions on the ﬁnite set
E = Cn × A−n × T, where ˆ an is deﬁned by
ˆ an(cn,a−n,t) = un(cn,(a−n,an),t) for each (cn,a−n,t) ∈ E.
According to theorem 3.3 there is a ﬁnite subfamily G of F such that
G -dominates F.
Note that G is of the form {ˆ bn : E → R : bn ∈ An()} where An() is a
suitable ﬁnite subset of An. The -dominance of F by G implies that for all
(c,a−n,t) ∈ E we have:
ˆ bn(c,a−n,t) ≥ ˆ an(c,a−n,t) −  or
un(c,(a−n,bn),t) ≥ un(c,(a−n,an),t) −  (3.4)
Let Γ() be the ﬁnite game with
Γ() =< N,A1,A2,...,An−1,An(),T1,T2,...,Tn,p,C1,C2,...,Cn,u1,u2,...,un >.
By taking an() = bn in (3.4) we obtain (3.1). 
4 Concluding remarks
In theorem 2.2 we established the existence of BM-equilibria in mixed strate-
gies for ﬁnite BM-games. Using the covering theorem and then the approxi-
mation with ﬁnite games, the existence of -BM equilibria is established for
semi-inﬁnite BM-games with upper bounded payoﬀ functions.
8A topic for further research could be the study of BM-games where all (or
all but one) strategy spaces are compact sets and the payoﬀ functions satisfy
suitable continuity and concavity properties guaranteeing BM-equilibria (or
-BM-equilibria).
For the subclass of strategic games such a research was done in [8].
Another topic for further research could be the study of BM-games with a
potential ( [4], [2], [11]).
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